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COURT OF APPEALS, 1958 TERM
DUTY ToWAn TRESPASSSERS: OBJECTIVE TEST
Plaintiff, a six year old boy, entered defendant's railroad yard and climbed
onto a ladder attached to one of the boxcars of a train. As the train began
moving, one of defendant's employees ran toward the plaintiff, and while
about three or four cars away from him, shouted to the lad to get off the train.
Immediately thereafter, plaintiff fell from the car and was injured by the
moving train. The question presented, in an action to recover for the youth's
injuries, Lo Casto v. Long Island R.R.Co.,6 was whether the actions of this
employee constituted a breach of the duty owed to plaintiff-trespasser. The
Supreme Court entered judgment on verdict for plaintiff, but was reversed by
the Appellate Division. The reversal was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Generally, one's only duty to trespassers is to abstain from inflicting
intentional, wanton or wilfull injuries. 67 Two prior decisions of the Court
seem to lay a frame of reference upon which to assess the instant decision.
In Ansteth v. Buffalo Ry. Co.,0 8 a conductor came onto the car platform on
which a youth was standing and reached for the boy. In allowing recovery,
the Court held the acts of the employee improper and unnecessarily dangerous,
and therefore a breach of defendant's duty to a trespasser. In so holding, the
Court said the boy was justified in believing violence to his person was immi-
nent. In Ralff v. Long Island R.R.Co.,69 however, on facts similar to those
of the instant case, except that plaintiff did not see the person who was shout-
ing at him, though he heard the shouting, recovery was denied. Mere calling
to a plaintiff to get off the train, said the Court, cannot constitute the wilfull
conduct required.
Although fear of violence to his person may well have caused the injury
producing incident in the instant case, the Court makes it clear that the test
of breach of duty to the trespasser is judged by an objective standard. Fear
resulting from acts occuring three or four cars away from the plaintiff cannot,
as a matter of law, operate to sustain a verdict requiring expectation of
imminent violence.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
SUFFICIENCY OF CAUSAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ACCIDENT AND DEATH
Plaintiff, a sixty year old truck driver, was operating his employer's truck
when it was struck by another vehicle. The impact caused him to be thrown
to the pavement and rendered unconscious for several minutes. A medical
examination revealed that he had suffered various abrasions, bruises and sore-
ness throughout his shoulders and chest area. Plaintiff made no complaints
of a cardiac nature and the doctor found no evidence of any cardiac ailment.
66. 6 N.Y.2d 470, 190 N.Y.S.2d 366 (1959).
67. Carbone v. Mackchil Realty Corporation, 296 N.Y. 154, 71 N.E.2d 447 (1947).
68. 145 N.Y. 210, 39 N.E. 708 (1895).
69. 266 AD. 794, 41 N.Y.S.2d 620, aff'd 292 N.Y. 656, 55 N.E.2d 518 (1944).
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Within two weeks he returned to work and continued in his normal employ-
ment for about three weeks, when he died of a coronary occlusion and coronary
thrombosis during his sleep. There is no evidence of any injury or probable
cause of death other than the accident described.
The Workmen's Compensation Board made an award in favor of the
claimant. The Appellate Division affirmed,1 and this appeal was taken. The
Court of Appeals held that the evidence sustained a finding that the work-
man's fatal coronary attack was causally related to injuries he sustained in
the work-connected automobile collision.2
The difficulty in this case was presented by the sharp dispute in evidence
of the two physicians who testified on the issue of causal relationship. The
doctor testifying for the claimant based his conclusion on the possibility that
the accident produced a certain sequence of events which led to the heart
attack some thirty days later. He could in no way prove conclusively that
these particular events did in fact occur. The appellant's witness based his
findings on the autopsy and microscopic examination of the heart.
There have been many cases which have dealt with the problem of causal
relationship brought about by lapse of a substantial period of time between
the accident and the death. Cases which have denied recovery usually turn
on the fact that -the evidence does not sustain the finding that an accident
occurred,3 or ample evidence is presented to show that an accident is being
feigned.4 In the cases of coronaries, the evidence often fails to show whether
the accident occurred before or after the attackY However, where there is
clear, convincing evidence establishing that an accident did in fact occur, the
courts have been very liberal in finding causal relationship. 6 Expert testimony,
although controverted, is not rejected as insufficient in law because it is not
given with positive medical certainty. "The law does not require proof of such
positiveness. It is sufficient if from the facts a reasonable inference arises that
the exertioncaused death." 
7
The position of the dissent is that the testimony of the appellant's witness
is conclusive because of the lack of direct evidence to contradict it. This is
assuming that the testimony of the claimant's doctor is mere speculation and
no reasonable inference of fact arises. It is submitted that taking this view
would deny compensation in many cases which are borderline. This would
not be consistent with the theory underlying the Workmen's Compensation
Acts. These acts have attempted to mitigate the burden of injuries on em-
1. Palermo v. Samuel Gallucci and Son Inc., 6 A.D.2d 911, 176 N.Y.S.2d 95 (3d
Dep't 1958).
2. Palermo v. Samuel Galluci and Son Inc., 5 N.Y.2d 529, 186 N.Y.S.2d 255 (1959).
3. McCormack v. National City Bank, 303 N.Y. 5, 99 N.E.2d 887 (1951).
4. Carroll v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 218 N.Y. 212, 113 N.E. 507 (1954).
S. Riehl v. Town of Amherst, 308 N.Y. 212, 124 N.E.2d 287 (1954).
6. Suschinski v. Allegheny Ludlum Steel Corp., 5 A.D.2d 903, 171 N.Y.S.2d 173 (3d
Dep't 1958); Boltrak v. Mike Schechter Inc., 5 A.D.2d 725, 169 N.Y.S.2d 733 (3d Dep't
1957); Wachsitork v. Sky View Transportation Co., 5 A.D.2d 1028, 173 N.Y.S.2d 405 (3d
Dep't 1958) ; Mathiez v. Meyer, 6 A.D.2d 741, 174 N.Y.S.2d 340 (3d Dep't 1958).
7. Green v. Geiger, 253 A.D. 469, 471, 3 N.Y.S.2d 269 (3d Dep't 1958).
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ployees by eliminating many of the common law defenses of the employer,
thereby allowing recovery in a greater number of cases. The rationale for this
is founded on the fact that employers may insure themselves and add this to
their cost of doing business which in effect places the cost on the consumer.
In the instant case, the facts clearly show that an accident did occur, and no
evidence was submitted indicating the possibility of fraud. Since the major
issue in this case was the conflicting medical testimony, the mere fact that the
conflict existed should be enough to raise a doubt as to whether or not the
accident produced the fatal attack. This doubt having been resolved by the
Board in favor of the claimant coupled with the policy considerations behind
Workmen's Compensation is sufficient justification for affirming the award.
CORONARY THROMBOSIS AS BASIS OF CLAI
An accidental injury, arising out of, or sustained in the course of one's
employment, is compensable under New York's Workmen's Compensation Law
so long as the injury complained of is one within the meaning of the term
"industrial accident." "What constitutes an 'industrial accident' is to be
determined by the common-sense viewpoint of the average man."18
In Schecter v. State Insurance Fund,9 the claimant, Senior Trial Attorney
in charge of all litigation for the State Insurance Fund, suffered a heart attack
after his work load had been significantly increased. The Workmen's Compen-
sation Board granted an award to him which was subsequently set aside by the
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, Third Department, which held that
there was no accident within the legal meaning of the word. 10 However, the
Court of Appeals, in a five to two decision, reinstated the award granted by
the board.
A coronary thrombosis is compensable under the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Law provided it results from unusual or excessive strain in the performance
of one's work." Furthermore, one may be subjected to such strain although
the work performed is of the same general type as that in which one is regu-
larly involved, 12 and the fact that there is a pre-existing pathology which
contributes to the injury is not sufficient reason for denial of compensation. 18
In the instant case, the claimant normally spent sixty to seventy percent
of his time in court performing his work as trial counsel but, for a seven week
period immediately preceeding the heart attack, he was required to be present
in court one hundred percent of the time.
At the hearing before the Workmen's Compensation Board conflicting
expert medical testimony was advanced on behalf of both the claimant and
the carrier as to the causal connection between the increased workload and the
8. Masse v. James H. Robinson Co., 301 N.Y. 34, 37, 92 N.E.2d 56, 57 (1950).
9. 6 N.Y.2d 506, 190 N.Y.S.2d 656 (1959).
10. 7 A.D.2d 813, 180 N.Y.S.2d 782 (3d Dep't 1959).
11. Cooper v. Brunswick Cigar Co., 298 N.Y. 731, 83 N.E.2d 142 (1948).
12. Sleator v. National City Bank, 309 N.Y. 708, 128 N.E.2d 415 (1955).
13. Cooper v. Brunswick Cigar Co., supra., note 11.
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